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Axiomatic Bayesian Utilitarianism

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  • Richard Bradley

    (LSE - Laboratoire des Sciences de l'Éducation (Grenoble) - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2)

Abstract

This paper investigates, within the axiomatic framework of Jeffrey-Bolker decision theory, the relation between two kinds of conditions: (1) The Utilitarian condition that social expected utility function is a weighted sum of the individual expected utility functions; and (2) Homogeneity conditions on the probability and utility functions of individuals. In particular, we show that identity of individuals' probabilities is necessary and sufficient for the Utilitarian condition to hold and that it can be derived from an earlier Pareto condition on the relation between individual and social rankings, provided that these rankings are separable in a particular sense.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Bradley, 2003. "Axiomatic Bayesian Utilitarianism," Working Papers hal-00242956, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242956
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242956
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mongin Philippe, 1995. "Consistent Bayesian Aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 313-351, August.
    2. John Broome, 1990. "Bolker-Jeffrey Expected Utility Theory and Axiomatic Utilitarianism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 477-502.
    3. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 309-309.
    4. Hammond, Peter J, 1981. "Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 48(191), pages 235-250, August.
    5. Ramsey, Frank P., 1926. "Truth and Probability," Histoy of Economic Thought Chapters, in: Braithwaite, R. B. (ed.),The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, chapter 7, pages 156-198, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought.
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