A Note on Affine Aggregation
If a vector-valued function has convex range and one of its components is related to the others by a Pareto-like condition, that component must be affine w.r.t. the others; sign restrictions on the coefficients follow from suitably strengthening the unanimity condition. The theorem is applied to social choice and decision theories.
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 1994|
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- Mongin, P., .
"Consistent Bayesian aggregation,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1176, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Karni, Edi & Schmeidler, David & Vind, Karl, 1983. "On State Dependent Preferences and Subjective Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1021-31, July.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309.
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