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Extended Paretian Rules and Relative Utilitarianism


  • DHILLON , Amrita

    (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)


This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of 2 other axioms: "Anonymity" and a weak version of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: "Weak IIA" it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called "Relative Utilitarianism" that consists of normalising individual utilities between 0 and 1 and adding them.

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  • DHILLON , Amrita, 1995. "Extended Paretian Rules and Relative Utilitarianism," CORE Discussion Papers 1995052, Universit√© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1995052

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Galor, Oded & Stark, Oded, 1991. "The Impact of Differences in the Levels of Technology on International Labor Migration," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 4(1), pages 1-12, March.
    2. Galor, Oded, 1986. "Time preference and international labor migration," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-20, February.
    3. Galor, Oded, 1992. "The Choice of Factor Mobility in a Dynamic World," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 5(2), pages 135-144, April.
    4. Kochhar, Rakesh, 1992. "International Labor Migration and Domestic Labor Supply," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 5(2), pages 113-134, April.
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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations


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