IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvco/1995052.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Extended Paretian Rules and Relative Utilitarianism

Author

Listed:
  • DHILLON , Amrita

    (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Abstract

This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of 2 other axioms: "Anonymity" and a weak version of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: "Weak IIA" it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called "Relative Utilitarianism" that consists of normalising individual utilities between 0 and 1 and adding them.

Suggested Citation

  • DHILLON , Amrita, 1995. "Extended Paretian Rules and Relative Utilitarianism," CORE Discussion Papers 1995052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1995052
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://uclouvain.be/en/research-institutes/immaq/core/dp-1995.html
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Epstein, Larry G & Segal, Uzi, 1992. "Quadratic Social Welfare Functions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 691-712, August.
    2. Marcus Fleming, 1952. "A Cardinal Concept of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 366-384.
    3. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1977. "Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 219-225, February.
    4. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309-309.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1995052. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.