Relative utilitarianism an improved axiomatisation
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- Dhillon, Amrita & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1997.
"An impossibility theorem with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences,"
Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 305-309, November.
- Dhillon, A. & Mertens, J.-F., 1997. "An impossiblity theorem with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1292, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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KeywordsAxiomatisation; Social Choice; Social Welfare Function; Utilitarianism; Welfarism; Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem; Expected Utility;
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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