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Better than Ploughing

In: Recollections of Eminent Economists

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  • James M. Buchanan

Abstract

My title’s description of an academic career is taken directly from Frank H. Knight, from whom I take so much. Nonetheless, my origins in the rural agricultural poverty of the upper south (Tennessee) in the United States, along with the sometimes pretentious efforts of the middle-class poor to impose social distinctions, are surely explanatory elements in any narrative account of my own history.

Suggested Citation

  • James M. Buchanan, 1989. "Better than Ploughing," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: J. A. Kregel (ed.), Recollections of Eminent Economists, chapter 12, pages 279-295, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-09776-0_12
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-09776-0_12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, Enero-Abr.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Choice; Choice Setting; Public Debt; Political Agent; Public Choice Theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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