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A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation


  • Saglam, Ismail


This paper shows that in an incomplete information situation if the set of states of the society which occur with positive probability satisfies 'connection' condition, then closure condition will be satisfied by all social choice sets. It then follows from Jackson's (1991) two fundamental theorems that whenever 'connection' holds and there are at least three agents in the society, for the implementability of social choice sets in Bayesian equilibrium, incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity conditions are both necessary and sufficient in economic environments whereas incentive compatibility and monotonicity-no-veto conditions are sufficient in noneconomic environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Saglam, Ismail, 1997. "A Note on Jackson's Theorems in Bayesian Implementation," MPRA Paper 2330, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2330

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 115-134, January.
    2. Thomas R. Palfrey & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Bayesian Implementable Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 193-208.
    3. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 668-691, June.
    4. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-477, March.
    5. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.

    More about this item


    Bayesian implementation; incomplete information;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations


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