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Strongly Implementable Social Choice Correspondences

Listed author(s):
  • Peter Fristrup

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Hans Keiding

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

A social choice correspondance is strongly implementable if there is a mechanism such that its strong Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with the alternatives chosen by the social choice correspondance. It is known that a strongly implementable social choice correspondence is contained in the core correspondence of its associated effectivity function, and conversely Holzman (1987) introduced the nucleus correspondence which is in a certain sense minimal among the strongly implementable social choice correspondences. In the present paper, a new solution concept for games in effectivity function form, the supernucleus, is introduced. The supernucleus social choice correspondence is founded on strategic behaviour. It is less restrictive than the nucleus, and it is contained in the core. We show that the supernucleus correspondence is implementable and that it has a minimality property similar to that of the nucleus.

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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 88-14.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1988
Publication status: Published in: Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18(2) pp 213-226
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:8814
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