Strongly Implementable Social Choice Correspondences
A social choice correspondance is strongly implementable if there is a mechanism such that its strong Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with the alternatives chosen by the social choice correspondance. It is known that a strongly implementable social choice correspondence is contained in the core correspondence of its associated effectivity function, and conversely Holzman (1987) introduced the nucleus correspondence which is in a certain sense minimal among the strongly implementable social choice correspondences. In the present paper, a new solution concept for games in effectivity function form, the supernucleus, is introduced. The supernucleus social choice correspondence is founded on strategic behaviour. It is less restrictive than the nucleus, and it is contained in the core. We show that the supernucleus correspondence is implementable and that it has a minimality property similar to that of the nucleus.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1988|
|Publication status:||Published in: Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18(2) pp 213-226|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark|
Phone: (+45) 35 32 30 10
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:8814. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.