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The economic implications of voting requirements for the establishment of the European Monetary Union

Author

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  • Krumm, Raimund
  • Herz, Bernhard

Abstract

The European Council selects the EMU participants by a vote with a qualified majority. These voting requirements influence the benefit-cost-considerations of the EU states and may make it necessary to loosen the convergence criteria and/or to grant side payments, in order to achieve the necessary number of votes. However, not even making use of these options can guarantee the realization of a monetary union in every case. For this reason, supporting economic and institutional measures, such as convergence programs and the so-called stability pact, which diminish the binding character of the voting requirements, are of great importance.

Suggested Citation

  • Krumm, Raimund & Herz, Bernhard, 1996. "The economic implications of voting requirements for the establishment of the European Monetary Union," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 82, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:82
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Monetary Union; voting requirements; convergence; stability concessions; side payments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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