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The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations

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  • Motty Perry

    (Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel; University of Maryland, U.S.A.)

  • Daniel R. Vincent

    (Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel; University of Maryland, U.S.A.)

Abstract

In a patent race, social incentives and private incentives may sometimes coincide and at other times diverge - too many researchers remain in the race. If the social planner cannot determine what stage the researchers have achieved, this informational constraint can result in a socially suboptimal outcome. We construct a mechanism in which a planner exploits the researchers' private information to determine when and to whom to allocate rights to pursue the final prize. This mechanism does not require any payments and, therefore, will not distort earlier investment incentives. It is solvable by the iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Copyright 2002 by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

Suggested Citation

  • Motty Perry & Daniel R. Vincent, 2002. "The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1035-1052, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:43:y:2002:i:4:p:1035-1052
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    Cited by:

    1. By Kenneth L. Judd & Karl Schmedders & Şevin Yeltekin, 2012. "Optimal Rules For Patent Races," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 23-52, February.

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