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Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments

  • Fleurbaey, Marc
  • Suzumura, Kotaro
  • Tadenuma, Koichi

Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individuals' preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individuals' preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In a unified approach covering the theory of social choice and the theory of fair allocation, we investigate how much information is needed to rank a pair of allocations by social ordering functions and by allocation rules satisfying the Pareto principle and anonymity. In the standard model of division of commodities, we show that knowledge of a good portion of indifference hypersurfaces is needed for social ordering functions, whereas allocation rules require only knowledge of marginal rates of substitution.

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File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/14477/1/pie_dp2.pdf
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Paper provided by Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper with number 2.

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Length: 32 p.
Date of creation: Nov 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:piedp1:2
Note: This version: November 2000 (First version: January 2000)
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  1. LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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