Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments
Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individuals' preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individuals' preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In a unified approach covering the theory of social choice and the theory of fair allocation, we investigate how much information is needed to rank a pair of allocations by social ordering functions and by allocation rules satisfying the Pareto principle and anonymity. In the standard model of division of commodities, we show that knowledge of a good portion of indifference hypersurfaces is needed for social ordering functions, whereas allocation rules require only knowledge of marginal rates of substitution.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2000|
|Note:||This version: November 2000 (First version: January 2000)|
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- LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.