Temporary Alliance Formation: Endogenous Sequencing in Conflict Games
We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and , in case they win, later they fifht it out among themselves.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza. Canton Grande, 9. 15003 La Coruña, Spain|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:ieegpb:43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.