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A Strong No Show Paradox is a common flaw in Condorcet Voting Correspondences

Listed author(s):
  • Joaquín Pérez


    (Departamento de Fundamentos de Economía e Historia Económica. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Universidad de Alcalá (Spain).)

The No Show Paradox (there is a voter who would rather not vote) is known to affect every Condorcet voting function. This paper analyses a strong version of this paradox (there is a voter whose favorite candidate loses the election if she votes honestly, but gets elected if she abstains) in the context of Condorcet voting correspondences. All Condorcet correspondences satisfying some weak domination properties are shown to be affected by this strong form of the paradox. On the other hand, with the exception of the Simpson-Cramer Minmax, all the Condorcet correspondences that (to the best of our knowledge) are proposed in the literature suffer this paradox.

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Paper provided by Programa de doctorado en Economía. Universidad de Alcalá. in its series Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo with number 1/00.

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Length: pages 22
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision: 2000
Handle: RePEc:alc:alcddt:1/00
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