On Effcient and Procedurally-Fair Equilibrium Allocations in Sharing Games
In pruoduction economies with skill differences, this paper discusses resource allocation schemes which are consistent with two notions of procedural fairness: labor sovereignty and equal-division-for-equal-work (EDEW)[Kranich(1994)]. The paper first shows that there always exists an efficient EDEW allocation [Kranich(1994)], which is supported as a Nash equilibrium of a game induced by a sharing mechanism which satisfies the above two principles. Second, since there still remains the implementation problem of efficient EDEW allocations, the paper provides a selection mechanism which itself satisfies labor sovereignty and EDEW, and appropriately selects a sharing mechanism which supports an efficient EDEW allocation under any particular economy. As a result, the paper shows that efficient EDEW allocations can be implemented in Nash equilibria via this selection mechanism.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi City, Tokyo 186|
Web page: http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a397. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hiromichi Miyake)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.