Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good
We consider the sharing of the cost of producing a homogeneous good when the technology has variable returns and individuals have arbitrary demands. We give a full analytical description of the family of costsharing methods that allocate costs in propor tion to demands when returns are constant, and commute with the additivity and composition of cost functions.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, Vol. 27, 1999, pages 299-330|
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