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Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good

  • Moulin, Herve
  • Shenker, Scott

We consider the sharing of the cost of producing a homogeneous good when the technology has variable returns and individuals have arbitrary demands. We give a full analytical description of the family of costsharing methods that allocate costs in propor tion to demands when returns are constant, and commute with the additivity and composition of cost functions.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45JC96N-6/2/8e5159229848bc46a5bef8761aabb157
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 27 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 299-330

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:27:y:1999:i:2:p:299-330
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Moulin, Herve, 1995. "On Additive Methods to Share Joint Costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 98-99, August.
  2. Martin Shubik, 1961. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 112, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Pfingsten, Andreas, 1991. "Surplus-sharing methods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 287-301, June.
  4. William W. Sharkey & Richard P. McLean, 1998. "Weighted Aumann-Shapley pricing," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 511-523.
  5. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
  6. Friedman, Eric & Moulin, Herve, 1999. "Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 275-312, August.
  7. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-77, December.
  8. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
  9. Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Cooperative Production: A Comparison of Welfare Bounds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 200-208, December.
  10. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  11. Moulin, Herve, 1992. "Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 373-401, July.
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