Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice
This paper examines the logical performance of new welfare economics from the viewpoint of social choice theory.We show that the logical completeness of its research program hinges squarely on the possibility that, for each Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering R, the social choice set from any opportunity set can be recovered by finding the maximal set for each and every partial preference relation that is both a sub-relation of R and an extension of the Pareto quasiordering, and taking the intersection of these maximal sets. A neccessary and sufficient condition for this recoverability property is identified.
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|Date of creation:||Jan 1998|
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