Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice
Two distinct approaches can be identified in the new welfare economics. The school of thought based on the compensation principles attempted to see what can be said about social welfare without making interpersonal comparisons of well-being by extending the applicability of the Pareto principle through hypothetical compensatory payments between gainers and losers. The Bergson-Samuelson school of thought introduced the social welfare function as a formal method of introducing a Pareto-inclusive ethical belief on social welfare, whose policy implications the authors should theoretically explore. Synthesizing these two approaches, this paper identifies a condition under which the new welfare economics is logically impeccable.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 109 (1999)
Issue (Month): 455 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2 Dean Trench Street, Westminster, SW1P 3HE|
Phone: +44 20 3137 6301
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133|