Acyclic social welfare
In this paper we show that if the Pareto relation is acyclic then the set of all Pareto optimal social states coincides with chosen social states of acyclic Paretian social welfare relations. Subsequently we show that given an acyclic Paretian social welfare relations the set of all social states chosen by it coincides with the set of all states chosen by strict Paretian extensions whose strict extension is the given social welfare relation.
|Date of creation:||22 Feb 2009|
|Date of revision:||03 Mar 2009|
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- Moulin,Hervi, 1989.
"Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521360555.
- Suzumura, Kotaro, 1999.
"Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 204-20, April.
- Suzumura Kotaro, 1998. "Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice," Discussion Paper Series a341, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Banerjee, Asis & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1996. "A note on a property of maximal sets and choice in the absence of universal comparability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 191-195, May.
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