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Efficient and non-deteriorating choice

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  • Bossert, Walter
  • Sprumont, Yves

Abstract

We analyze collective choice procedures with respect to their rationalizability by means of profiles of individual preference orderings. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. Given the number of agents n, a selection function satisfies efficient and non-deteriorating n-rationalizability if there exists a profile of n orderings on the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives are (i) efficient for that profile, and (ii) at least as good as the reference option according to each individual preference. We analyze efficient and non-deteriorating collective choice in a general abstract framework and provide a characterization result given a universal set domain.
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  • Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2003. "Efficient and non-deteriorating choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 131-142, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:131-142
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    Cited by:

    1. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2018. "Costly switching from a status quo," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 55-70.
    2. Ruediger Bachmann, 2006. "Testable Implications of Pareto Efficiency and Individualrationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 489-504, November.
    3. Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
    4. Bachmann, Ruediger, 2006. "Testable implications of coalitional rationality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 101-105, October.
    5. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont, 2009. "Non‐Deteriorating Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(302), pages 337-363, April.
    6. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2005. "Learning From a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," THEMA Working Papers 2006-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    7. Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.
    8. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2006. "Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity," Cahiers de recherche 2006-13, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    9. Roee Teper, 2010. "Probabilistic Dominance and Status Quo Bias," Working Paper 5864, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    10. Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
    11. Scapparone, Paolo, 2015. "Existence of an upper hemi-continuous and convex-valued demand sub-correspondence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 123-129.
    12. Masatlioglu, Yusufcan & Ok, Efe A., 2005. "Rational choice with status quo bias," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 1-29, March.
    13. Shaofang Qi, 2016. "A characterization of the n-agent Pareto dominance relation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(3), pages 695-706, March.
    14. Riella, Gil & Teper, Roee, 2014. "Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 288-304.
    15. Tapki, Ipek Gursel, 2007. "Revealed incomplete preferences under status-quo bias," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 274-283, May.

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