Efficient and non-deteriorating choice
We analyze collective choice procedures with respect to their rationalizability by means of profiles of individual preference orderings. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. Given the number of agents n, a selection function satisfies efficient and non-deteriorating n-rationalizability if there exists a profile of n orderings on the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives are (i) efficient for that profile, and (ii) at least as good as the reference option according to each individual preference. We analyze efficient and non-deteriorating collective choice in a general abstract framework and provide a characterization result given a universal set domain.
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