Testable implications of coalitional rationality
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References listed on IDEAS
- Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "Revealed Preferences and Differentiable Demand: Notes and Comments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 687-691, May.
- Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2003. "Efficient and non-deteriorating choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 131-142, April.
- Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.
- Bachmann, Ruediger, 2004. "Rationalizing allocation data--a nonparametric Walrasian theory when prices are absent or non-Walrasian," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 271-295, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013.
"Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
- Susan Snyder & Indrajit Ray, 2004. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 407, Econometric Society.
- Indrajit Ray & Susan Snyder, 2013. "Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games," Discussion Papers 04-14r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Robert R. Routledge, 2009. "Testable implications of the Bertrand model," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0918, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Agatsuma, Yasushi, 2016. "Testable implications of the core in TU market games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 23-29.
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