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Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures

Author

Listed:
  • Laruelle, Annick

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

  • Widgren, Mika

    (Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, Helsinki; CEPR)

Abstract

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to access actors‚ influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative voting game and uses the EU as an example. By a subsequent specialization of power indices we are able to quantify, for instance, to what extent the development of the decision-making procedures on the EU has changed the division of power among its main organs.

Suggested Citation

  • Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1998001, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1998001
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    Cited by:

    1. Widgren, Mika, 2001. "Optimal Majority Rules and Enhanced Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. N. F. Matsatsinis & E. Grigoroudis & A. Samaras, 2005. "Aggregation and Disaggregation of Preferences for Collective Decision-Making," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 217-232, May.
    3. Borkowski, Agnieszka, 2003. "Machtverteilung Im Ministerrat Nach Dem Vertrag Von Nizza Und Den Konventsvorschlagen In Einer Erweiterten Europaischen Union," IAMO Discussion Papers 14887, Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    4. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 1999. "Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 291-308, July.
    5. Borkowski, Agnieszka, 2003. "Machtverteilung im Ministerrat: nach dem Vertrag von Nizza und den Konventsvorschlägen in einer erweiterten Europäischen Union," IAMO Discussion Papers 54, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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