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Machtverteilung im Ministerrat: nach dem Vertrag von Nizza und den Konventsvorschlägen in einer erweiterten Europäischen Union

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  • Borkowski, Agnieszka

Abstract

Mit dem Beitritt der zehn neuen Mitgliedsstaaten zur Europäischen Union im Mai 2004 wird sich die bestehende Machtverteilung zwischen den EU-Staaten verändern. Die Erweiterung wird sich auf die Effizienz der Entscheidungsfindung auswirken und deshalb sind weitere institutionelle Reformen innerhalb der EU notwendig. Der Vertrag von Nizza, welcher dieses Problem behandelte und auf der Regierungskonferenz im Dezember 2000 in Nizza beschlossen wurde, hat die EU nicht ausreichend auf die Erweiterung vorbereitet. Der Europäische Konvent, welcher einen ersten Entwurf einer Europäischen Verfassung erarbeitet hat, empfiehlt unter anderem weiterreichende Änderungen im institutionellem Bereich, vor allem bei den Entscheidungsverfahren im Ministerrat. Die vom Konvent vorgeschlagene neue qualifizierte Mehrheit (einfache Mehrheit der Staaten und 60 Prozent der EUBevölkerung ab 2009) würde die komplizierte dreifache Mehrheit (1. 72,27 Prozent der Stimmen im Rat der EU-25, 2. einfache Mehrheit der Staaten und 3. 62 Prozent der EU-Bevölkerung) für Beschlussfassungen im Ministerrat ersetzen, welche in Nizza vereinbart wurde und am 1. Januar 2005 in Kraft treten wird. Der Konventsvorschlag würde zwar die Entscheidungsprozedur vereinfachen, aber auch die Macht im Ministerrat zugunsten der vier größten Staaten, insbesondere Deutschlands, verlagern. Für die Analyse der Machtverteilung im Ministerrat nach der Erweiterung wurden Machtindizes angewandt. Diese ermöglichen eine Messung der Abstimmungsstärke eines Spielers/ Landes in einem Gremium mit Mehrheitsentscheidungsverfahren. Qualitative Aspekte der Macht, wie z.B. Präferenzen der Staaten, werden von diesen Maßen nicht berücksichtigt. Machtindizes dienen in dieser Analyse dazu, Veränderungen in der Abstimmungsstärke der Staaten in einer erweiterten EU zu quantifizieren sowie einige der Auswirkungen der institutionellen Reformen, die in Nizza bzw. durch den Konvent beschlossen bzw. vorgeschlagen wurden, darzustellen.

Suggested Citation

  • Borkowski, Agnieszka, 2003. "Machtverteilung im Ministerrat: nach dem Vertrag von Nizza und den Konventsvorschlägen in einer erweiterten Europäischen Union," IAMO Discussion Papers 54, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iamodp:14887
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EU; Entscheidungsverfahren; Erweiterung; Europäischer Konvent; Machtindex; EU; Decision-making process; Enlargement; European Convention; Power index;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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