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Stability in one-sided matching markets

Listed author(s):
  • Romero-Medina, Antonio
  • Cechlárová, Katarína

The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation, when it is allowed to form groups of any size (the stable partition problem). Two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets are suggested. For the first one, derived from the most prefered member of a set, it is shown that a stable partition always existis if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for its computation is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least prefered member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roornmates problem.

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía in its series UC3M Working papers. Economics with number 4158.

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Date of creation: Jul 1998
Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:4158
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