A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions
We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division, and show that, contrary to common wisdom, the tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.
|Date of creation:||07 Aug 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - .pdf and .ps versions available; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 38 ; figures: included|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://18.104.22.168|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9808001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.