IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpga/9808001.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions

Author

Listed:
  • Paola Manzini

    (Queen Mary and Westfield College)

  • Marco Mariotti

    (University of Exeter)

Abstract

We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division, and show that, contrary to common wisdom, the tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 1998. "A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions," Game Theory and Information 9808001, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9808001
    Note: Type of Document - .pdf and .ps versions available; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 38 ; figures: included
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/9808/9808001.ps.gz
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/9808/9808001.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2006:i:4:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2010. "Enhanced Coorporation in an asymmetric model of Tax Competition," Working Papers 1002, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    3. Clive Fraser & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2006. "Comparing the first-best and second-best provision of a club good: an example," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(4), pages 1-6.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Clubs; Coalition Formation; Multiperson Bargaining;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9808001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: http://econwpa.repec.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.