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A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions

  • Paola Manzini

    (Queen Mary and Westfield College)

  • Marco Mariotti

    (University of Exeter)

We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division, and show that, contrary to common wisdom, the tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9808001.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 07 Aug 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9808001
Note: Type of Document - .pdf and .ps versions available; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 38 ; figures: included
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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