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Nash Implementation in Truthful Strategies, Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency on the Restricted Domain of Leontief Preferences

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  • Nicolo, A.

Abstract

In exchange economies where agents have private information, strategy-proof social choice functions defined on large domains of preferences, are not efficient. We provide a restricted domain of preferences, namely the set of generalized Leontief utility functions, where there exist mechanisms that are strategy-proof and efficient. For the particular case of economies with two agents and two goods we are able to characterize the class of mechanisms that are efficient and Nash implementable in truthful strategies, a stronger requirement than strategy-proofness for social choice functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolo, A., 1998. "Nash Implementation in Truthful Strategies, Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency on the Restricted Domain of Leontief Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 418.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:418.98
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    Keywords

    EFFICIENCY ; SOCIAL CHOICE;

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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