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A Principal-Agent Building Block for the Study of Decentralization and Integration

  • Mariano Tommasi

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres)

  • Federico Weinschelbaum

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres)

The architecture of public decision making in the world is being changed through processes of “economic integration” and of “decentralization”. Some policy decisions are now taken at a higher level (i.e., monetary policy in Europe, trade policy in part of South America), while others are taken by smaller political units “closer to the people” (i.e., health and education policies in many Latin American countries). We provide a building block for the study of such processes, emphasizing the trade-o¤ between the advantages of centralized decision making (internalization of externalities) and those of decentralized decision making (increased principal-agent control by the citizens). We do so within the context of a class of principal-agent models known as common agency.

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File URL: ftp://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc20.pdf
File Function: First version, 1999
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Paper provided by Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia in its series Working Papers with number 20.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1999
Date of revision: Nov 1999
Handle: RePEc:sad:wpaper:20
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  16. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-46, May.
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