An Asymmetric Model of Spatial Competition
This paper explores a generalized spatial voting model in which parties are not supposed to be identical before the game. This new approach to the political market leads to substantial changes in parties' strategies. Our model provides new explanations of why parties may choose non median policies, i.e. other than that preferred by the median voter. It also provides explanations on why elections may not lead to close races.
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