Fixed agenda social choice correspondences
In this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondence under different rationality assumptions (independence, neutrality, monotonicity, ...). It is well know in the literature that, under some of theses assumptions, the existence of dictators, oligarchies or individuals with veto power can be proven ( and ); but no information about the social choice set is obtained. We now establish a relationship between the social choice set and the individual maximal sets which explicitly describes a fixed agenda social choice correspondence that satisfies theses rationality assumptions. Some of the results in  about the explicit representation of social decision functions are then translated and reinterpreted in the fixed agenda framework.
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- Denicolo Vincenzo, 1993.
"Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 324-332, April.
- V. Denicolo', 1989. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Corrispondences and Social Decision Functions," Working Papers 84, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-43, July.
- Aleskerov, Fuad, 1992. "Relational-Functional Voting Operations," Working Papers 818, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1987. "Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 311-314.
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