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Fixed agenda social choice correspondences

  • J. E. Peris
  • M-C. Sánchez

In this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondence under different rationality assumptions (independence, neutrality, monotonicity, ...). It is well know in the literature that, under some of theses assumptions, the existence of dictators, oligarchies or individuals with veto power can be proven ([7] and [10]); but no information about the social choice set is obtained. We now establish a relationship between the social choice set and the individual maximal sets which explicitly describes a fixed agenda social choice correspondence that satisfies theses rationality assumptions. Some of the results in [2] about the explicit representation of social decision functions are then translated and reinterpreted in the fixed agenda framework.

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 98-11.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:98-11
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  1. Aleskerov, Fuad, 1992. "Relational-Functional Voting Operations," Working Papers 818, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Denicolo Vincenzo, 1993. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 324-332, April.
  3. Moulin,Hervi, 1991. "Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521424585.
  4. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-43, July.
  5. Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1987. "Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 311-314.
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