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Fixed agenda social choice correspondences

Author

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  • J. E. Peris
  • M-C. Sánchez

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondences under different rationality assumptions (independence, neutrality, monotonicity,...).It is well known in the literature that, under some of these assumptions, the existence of dictators, oligarchies or individuals with veto power can be proven; butno information about the social choice set is obtained.
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Suggested Citation

  • J. E. Peris & M-C. Sánchez, 1998. "Fixed agenda social choice correspondences," THEMA Working Papers 98-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:98-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aleskerov, Fuad, 1992. "Relational-Functional Voting Operations," Working Papers 818, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    2. Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1987. "Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 311-314.
    3. Blair, Douglas H & Pollak, Robert A, 1982. "Acyclic Collective Choice Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 931-943, July.
    4. Denicolo Vincenzo, 1993. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 324-332, April.
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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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