Social Decision Rules Are Not Immune to Conflict
In this short paper, we ask the following question: Why is lobbying so endemic in societies? Put another way, might it not be possible to design a social decision rule that assigns to each group its equilibrium probability of success, and sidestep the inefficient waste of resources that results from conflict?
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|Date of creation:||1999|
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|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza. Canton Grande, 9. 15003 La Coruña, Spain|
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