Estado ¿versus? Mercado/State ¿Versus? Market
El Estado y el mercado son instituciones imperfectas. La idealización tanto del uno como del otro ha llevado a pedirles más de lo que podían ofrecer. Además, una de las consecuencias de la idealización ha sido una perspectiva de enfrentamiento permanente entre Estado y mercado en la investigación económica durante muchas décadas. Sin embargo, en los últimos años la visión de muchos economistas ha superado el dualismo contradictorio entre Estado y mercado, y busca espacios de complicidad donde lo público y lo privado colaboren recíprocamente para cumplir los cometidos que les son propios. Es decir, espacios donde el Estado y el mercado puedan complementarse y donde eficiencia y equidad se ayuden para avanzar simultáneamente. The State and the Market are imperfect institutions. Nonetheless, both of them have been idealized by their strongest supporters. Consequently, demands on the State and the Market have been much stronger than these institutions could reasonably provide. Also, the economists have used for a long time to look at the relationship between state and market as if they were permanently in conflict and contradiction. Nonetheless, in the recent years many economists have overcome this strict dualism State versus marked and have put the emphasis on the cooperative dimension of the public and private relationship. That is to say, economists’ research progressively seeks fields where the State and the Market can complement each other to properly do what each one is entitled to do.
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Volume (Year): 22 (2004)
Issue (Month): (Agosto)
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