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The dynamics of revolutions

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We study the dynamics of revolutions and mass protests. In a uni ed framework we explain three classes of observed revolutions, two of which are unexplained by earlier models: 1) a revolution initiated by extreme regime opponents dissenting greatly, later joined by moderate dissidents dissenting less; 2) a revolution initiated by moderates dissenting moderately, later joined by extremists; 3) a revolution where extreme regime opponents gradually push the freedom of speech, backed by increased dissent of mod- erates. These match the dynamics of many major revolutions, e.g., the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the fall of the USSR, the Egyptian Arab Spring and the Tiananmen-Square protests

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  • Moti Michaeli & Daniel Spiro, "undated". "The dynamics of revolutions," Working Papers WP2017/8, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201708
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    1. Chen, Daniel L. & Michaeli, Moti & Spiro, Daniel, 2023. "Non-confrontational extremists," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P5 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion

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