Political systems, stability and civil wars
In this paper we analyze theoretically and empirically the stability of the different political systems; that is, their ability to prevent conflict. According to our model, the proportional system has a lower probability of group rebellion than the majoritarian system. In the empirical part we test the role of political systems in preventing civil wars. We show that democracy by itself does not play an important explanatory role, while the specific type of political system-majoritarian, presidential and proportional-does. The rationale of this result is that different political systems entail different opportunity costs of rebellion.
Volume (Year): 13 (2002)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GDPE20|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert J. Barro, 1998.
"Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522543, July.
- Robert J. Barro, 1996. "Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study," NBER Working Papers 5698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2001. "Social decision rules are not immune to conflict," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 59-67, 03.
- Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 1999. "Social Decision Rules Are Not Immune to Conflict," Papers 22, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza.
- Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-573, October.
- Adam Kalai & Ehud Kalai, 1999. "Strategic Polarization," Discussion Papers 1266, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999. "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 379-415, August.
- Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 563-595, October.
- Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 2000. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2355, The World Bank.
- Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Development and Comp Systems 0409007, EconWPA.
- Barro, Robert J & Lee, Jong Wha, 1996. "International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 218-223, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)