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Strategic Polarization

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  • Adam Kalai
  • Ehud Kalai

Abstract

In joint decision making, people with common goals and similar preferences often take drastically opposing positions. In some cases, arbitrarily small discrepancies in preferences result in arbitrarily large losses in utility for all participants. An understanding of the properties of polarization may help game players and mechanism designers avoid its pitfalls.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Kalai & Ehud Kalai, 1999. "Strategic Polarization," Discussion Papers 1266, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1266
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1266.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2010. "Cost Benefit Analyses versus Referenda," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(1), pages 156-187, February.
    2. Marta Reynal-Querol, 2002. "Political systems, stability and civil wars," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, pages 465-483.

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