Stable Matchings and the Small Core in Nash Equilibrium in the College Admissions Problem
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References listed on IDEAS
- Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
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- Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 608-627.
More about this item
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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