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Citations for "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions"

by Cramton Peter & Schwartz Jesse A

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  1. Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2001. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses," Economics Papers 2002-W4, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Sep 2001.
  2. Todd Kaplan & Bradley Ruffle, 2004. "It's My Turn ... Please, After You: An Experimental Study of Cooperation and Social Conventions," Experimental 0410001, EconWPA.
  3. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1937, Econometric Society.
  4. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W26, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Madden, Gary & Bohlin, Erik & Tran, Thien & Morey, Aaron, 2013. "Spectrum licensing, policy instruments and market entry," 24th European Regional ITS Conference, Florence 2013 88476, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
  6. Peter Cramton, 2005. "How Best to Auction Oil Rights," Papers of Peter Cramton 06oil, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2005.
  7. Bazelon, Coleman & McHenry, Giulia, 2013. "Spectrum value," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 737-747.
  8. Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson, 1998. "A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules," Papers of Peter Cramton 98mdi, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton.
  9. Gian Albano & Fabrizio Germano & Stefano Lovo, 2006. "Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-8, April.
  10. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Auctioning Many Divisible Goods," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 480-493, 04/05.
  11. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W25, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  12. Stefano Lovo & Gian Luigi Albano & Fabrizio Germano, 2002. "On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects," Working Papers hal-00593867, HAL.
  13. Stefan Weishaar, 2007. "CO 2 emission allowance allocation mechanisms, allocative efficiency and the environment: a static and dynamic perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 29-70, August.
  14. Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson, 2007. "Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 07rev700, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007.
  15. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
  16. Alcalde, José & Matthias, Dahm, 2011. "Competition for Procurement Shares," QM&ET Working Papers 11-3, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
  17. Madden, Gary & Mayer, Walter & Wu, Chen & Tran, Thien, 2015. "The forecasting accuracy of models of post-award network deployment: An application of maximum score tests," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 1153-1158.
  18. Patrick Bajari & Jungwon Yeo, 2008. "Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions," NBER Working Papers 14441, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Börgers, Tilman & Dustmann, Christian, 2001. "Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction," CEPR Discussion Papers 3072, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Peter Cramton, 2009. "Innovation and Market Design," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, pages 113-137 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Bajari, Patrick & Yeo, Jungwon, 2009. "Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 90-100, June.
  22. Peter Cramton, 2004. "Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit4, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
  23. Filiz-Ozbay, Emel & Lopez-Vargas, Kristian & Ozbay, Erkut Y., 2015. "Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-16.
  24. Peter Cramton, 2007. "Comments on the RGGI Market Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 07rggi, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007.
  25. Uður Emek, 2002. "The Role of Auction Design in Awarding Spectrum," Game Theory and Information 0209001, EconWPA.
  26. Leslie Marx, 2006. "Economics at the Federal Communications Commission," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 349-368, December.
  27. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999.
  28. Andrés Pereyra, 2001. "Subasta de telefonía móvil: ¿una experiencia inconclusa en Uruguay?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0302, Department of Economics - dECON.
  29. Kagel, John H. & Lien, Yuanchuan & Milgrom, Paul, 2014. "Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 210-231.
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