5th Helsinki Workshop on Standardization and Networks, 13-14 August, 2000
The fast development in communications and information based industries as well as in other network related industries gives rise to new constellations in competition and innovation. These are strongly dependent on strategic decisions which can be analysed by the concepts of network externalities, compatibility and standardization. This report disseminates research on these issues presented at the 5th Helsinki Workshop on Standardization and Networks 13-14 August, 2000, organized by the Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT). The papers deal with these issues from a theoretical, econometric and applied perspective.
|Date of creation:||31 Dec 2000|
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- Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000.
"Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-52, May.
- Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999.
- Pitchik, Carolyn & Schotter, Andrew, 1986.
"Perfect Equilibria in Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study,"
86-22, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Carolyn Pitchik & Andrew Schotter, 1988. "Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 363-388, Autumn.
- Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 1988.
"Cartel Stability in Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
8802, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas, 1988. "Cartel Stability in Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 351-58, March.
- Peter Cramton, 1998.
"The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
98jlefcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 27 Jul 1998.
- Donald B. Hausch, 1986. "Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1599-1610, December.
- McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
- Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
- Palfrey, Thomas R, 1983. "Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 463-83, March.
- Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Papers of Peter Cramton 98cra2, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton.
- Bykowsky, Mark M & Cull, Robert J & Ledyard, John O, 2000.
"Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 205-28, May.
- Bykowsky, Mark M. & Cull, Robert J. & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Working Papers 916, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 141-145, Spring.
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