Simultaneous Ascending Auction
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Grigorieva, Elena & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries, 2012.
"Fraction auctions: The tradeoff between efficiency and running time,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(2), pages 577-587.
- Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P.J.J. & Müller, R.J. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2009. "Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time," Research Memorandum 045, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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More about this item
Keywords
Auctions; Ascending Auctions; Market Design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2004-05-16 (Industrial Competition)
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