IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jemstr/v20y2011i4p1171-1196.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bids as a Vehicle of (Mis)Information: Collusion in English Auctions with Affiliated Values

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Pagnozzi

Abstract

During an English auction, bidders' behaviour conveys information on their valuation of the prize. So whenever valuations are not independent, a bidder's strategy depends on the price at which his competitors drop out before he does. A ring of bidders can strategically manipulate the information reported through its members' bids, in order to mislead other bidders into bidding less aggressively and so allow a ring member to bid more aggressively. Collusion increases the probability that a ring bidder wins the auction and reduces the price he pays. The presence of a ring harms other bidders (as well as the seller) and reduces efficiency.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Pagnozzi, 2011. "Bids as a Vehicle of (Mis)Information: Collusion in English Auctions with Affiliated Values," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 1171-1196, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:20:y:2011:i:4:p:1171-1196
    DOI: j.1530-9134.2011.00318.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00318.x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:iepoli:v:40:y:2017:i:c:p:48-59 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:oup:jcomle:v:3:y:2007:i:1:p:1-47. is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Paul Klemperer, 2007. "Bidding Markets," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-47.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:20:y:2011:i:4:p:1171-1196. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.