Wojciech Olszewski
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Kala Krishna & Sergey Lychagin & Wojciech Olszewski & Ron Siegel & Chloe Tergiman, 2022.
"Pareto Improvements in the Contest for College Admissions,"
NBER Working Papers
30220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Cited by:
- Wouter Dessein & Alex Frankel & Navin Kartik, 2023.
"Test-Optional Admissions,"
Papers
2304.07551, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
- Dessein, Wouter & Frankel, Alexander & Kartik, Navin, 2023. "Test-Optional Admissions," CEPR Discussion Papers 18090, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Wouter Dessein & Alex Frankel & Navin Kartik, 2025. "Test-Optional Admissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(9), pages 3130-3170, September.
- Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2022. "Introduction to the Special Issue on Contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1017-1023, November.
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2019.
"A Simple Model of Competitive Testing,"
MPRA Paper
94605, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Boris Ginzburg, 2025. "A simple model of competitive testing," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 63(3), pages 888-902, July.
- Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "A Simple Model of Competitive Testing," MPRA Paper 99463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Penghuan Yan, 2024. "Balancing Selection Efficiency and Societal Costs in Selective Contests," Papers 2409.09768, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Yingkai Li & Xiaoyun Qiu, 2023. "Screening Signal-Manipulating Agents via Contests," Papers 2302.09168, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021.
"Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1557-1593, July.
- Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_288, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Hayri A. Arslan, 2021. "Preference estimation in centralized college admissions from reported lists," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 61(5), pages 2865-2911, November.
- Martin Gregor, 2021. "Electives Shopping, Grading Policies and Grading Competition," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(350), pages 364-398, April.
- Wouter Dessein & Alex Frankel & Navin Kartik, 2023.
"Test-Optional Admissions,"
Papers
2304.07551, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
- Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1437-1466, November.
Cited by:
- DeMarzo, Peter M. & Kremer, Ilan & Mansour, Yishay, 2016. "Robust option pricing: Hannan and Blackwell meet Black and Scholes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 410-434.
- Yossi Feinberg & Nicolas Lambert, 2015.
"Mostly calibrated,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 153-163, February.
- Feinberg, Yossi & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2011. "Mostly Calibrated," Research Papers 2090, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Colin Stewart, 2009.
"Nonmanipulable Bayesian Testing,"
Working Papers
tecipa-360, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Colin, Stewart, 2011. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2029-2041, September.
- Olszewski, Wojciech, 2015. "Calibration and Expert Testing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
- Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2011.
"A Strategy-Proof Test of Portfolio Returns,"
Working Papers
11-50, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
- H Peyton Young & Dean P. Foster, 2011. "A Strategy-Proof Test of Portfolio Returns," Economics Series Working Papers 567, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, 2012. "A strategy-proof test of portfolio returns," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(5), pages 671-683, March.
- Kavaler, Itay & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2019. "On comparison of experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 94-109.
- Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2023. "Redeeming Falsifiability?," Papers 2303.15723, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2026.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2010. "Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2203-2217, November.
- Itay Kavaler & Rann Smorodinsky, 2019. "A Cardinal Comparison of Experts," Papers 1908.10649, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2020.
- Yaron Azrieli & Christopher Chambers & Paul Healy & Nicolas Lambert, 2025. "Elicitability," Papers 2510.00879, arXiv.org.
- Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 1425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2021.
"Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 483-504, March.
- David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2018. "Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism," Working Papers 1808, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Lambert, Nicolas S. & Langford, John & Wortman Vaughan, Jennifer & Chen, Yiling & Reeves, Daniel M. & Shoham, Yoav & Pennock, David M., 2015. "An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 389-416.
- Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Falsifiability," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Freedman, David A., 2009. "Diagnostics cannot have much power against general alternatives," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 833-839, October.
- Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
- George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring,"
Discussion Papers
1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
- George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
Cited by:
- Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2016. "Bounded memory Folk Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 728-774.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Urgun, Can, 2011. "Stochastic discounting in repeated games: Awaiting the almost inevitable," MPRA Paper 28537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lesigang, Franziska & Hilbe, Christian & Glynatsi, Nikoleta E., 2025. "Can I afford to remember less than you? Best responses in repeated additive games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 250(C).
- Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
- Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2013. "Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 187-206, June.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2012.
"A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
12-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2012. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory," Working Papers 1379, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2025.
"Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(2), pages 493-514, September.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023. "Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication," Papers 2311.12242, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023. "Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
- Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013.
"Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
- Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Working Papers 1325, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Phelan, Christopher & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2015. "Recall and private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 162-170.
- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2013. "Belief free equilibria," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Heller, Yuval, 2017.
"Instability of belief-free equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
- Yuval Heller, 2017. "Instability of Belief-free Equilibria," Working Papers 2017-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000178, David K. Levine.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2012. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Hino, Yoshifumi, 2018. "A folk theorem in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with small observation cost," MPRA Paper 90381, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011.
"Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Scholarly Articles 27755311, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
- Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2012.
"Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations,"
Working Paper Series
rwp12-055, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Aperjis, Christina & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Miao, Yali, 2014. "Variable temptations and black mark reputations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 70-90.
- Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard Jay, 2011. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," Scholarly Articles 5027138, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard Jay & Aperjis, Christina, 2012. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," Scholarly Articles 9924086, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2011. "Variable Temptations and Black Market Reputations," Working Paper Series 11-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Christina Aperjis & Yali Miao & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2010. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," NBER Working Papers 16423, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benjamin Sperisen, 2018. "Bad Reputation Under Bounded And Fading Memory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 138-157, January.
- Can, B., 2012.
"Weighted distances between preferences,"
Research Memorandum
056, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Can, Burak, 2014. "Weighted distances between preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 109-115.
- Hilbe, Christian & Traulsen, Arne & Sigmund, Karl, 2015. "Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 41-52.
- Hino, Yoshifumi, 2018. "A folk theorem in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with small observation cost," MPRA Paper 96010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 13 Sep 2019.
- Benjamin Sperisen, 2016. "Bounded Memory, Reputation, and Impatience," Working Papers 1602, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Okada, A. & Sabourian, H., 2025. "Collusive Behaviour, Efficiency and Cheap Talk Negotiation in Repeated Games," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2575, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Benjamin Sperisen, 2015. "Bad Reputation under Bounded and Fading Memory," Working Papers 1527, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Laclau, M., 2014.
"Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
- Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011.
"Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
- George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Okada, A. & Sabourian, H., 2025. "Collusive Behaviour, Efficiency and Cheap Talk Negotiation in Repeated Games," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2532, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Falsifiability,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
Cited by:
- Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 1425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1437-1466, November.
- Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006.
"Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests,"
Discussion Papers
1425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
Cited by:
- Dean Foster & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Calibration: Respice, Adspice, Prospice," Discussion Papers 1537, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Colin Stewart, 2009.
"Nonmanipulable Bayesian Testing,"
Working Papers
tecipa-360, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Colin, Stewart, 2011. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2029-2041, September.
- Feinberg, Yossi & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2011.
"Mostly Calibrated,"
Research Papers
2090, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Yossi Feinberg & Nicolas Lambert, 2015. "Mostly calibrated," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 153-163, February.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2010. "Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2203-2217, November.
- Francisco Barreras & Alvaro J. Riascos, 2016.
"Screening multiple potentially false experts,"
Monografías,
Quantil, number 15075, November.
- Francisco Barreras & Alvaro Jose Riascos Villegas, 2016. "Screening multiple potentially false experts," Monografías, Quantil, number 18207, November.
- Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008.
"Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
08-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1437-1466, November.
- , & ,, 2013. "Expressible inspections," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
- Feinberg, Yossi & Stewart, Colin, 2007.
"Testing Multiple Forecasters,"
Research Papers
1957, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Yossi Feinberg & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Testing Multiple Forecasters," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 561-582, May.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2013. "A difficulty in the testing of strategic experts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 5-9.
- Francisco Barreras, 2017. "Screening Multiple Uninformed Experts," Documentos de Trabajo 15282, Quantil.
- Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005.
"The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring,"
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
172782000000000006, www.najecon.org.
- Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2006. "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1499-1544, November.
- Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2006. "The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00119553, HAL.
Cited by:
- Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Carmona, Guilherme & Laohakunakorn, Krittanai, 2023. "The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Barlo, Mehmet & Urgun, Can, 2011. "Stochastic discounting in repeated games: Awaiting the almost inevitable," MPRA Paper 28537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
- Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
- ,, 2015. "Merging with a set of probability measures: a characterization," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Feb 2011.
- , H. & ,, 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt,"
Discussion Papers
1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers 573, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NBER Working Papers 12100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
- Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Working Papers 07-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 321307000000000026, www.najecon.org.
- Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001094, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2010. "Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 42-62, January.
- Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
- Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2013. "Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 187-206, June.
- George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics.
- , J. & ,, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2005.
- Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Obara, Ichiro, 2009.
"Folk theorem with communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 120-134, January.
- Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Folk Theorem with Communication," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michihiro Kandori, 2006. "Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-395, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2025.
"Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(2), pages 493-514, September.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023. "Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication," Papers 2311.12242, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023. "Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
- Jiawei Li & Graham Kendall, 2015. "On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(8), pages 1-9, August.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013.
"Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
- Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Working Papers 1325, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014.
"Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags,"
Scholarly Articles
11880354, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
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Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
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Articles
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PIER Working Paper Archive
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"Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 367-383, February.
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Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1499-1544, November.
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