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Redeeming Falsifiability?

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  • Mark Whitmeyer
  • Kun Zhang

Abstract

We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory, offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory. We argue that if the informed expert can acquire additional information, falsifiability does have the power to identify worthless theories.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Whitmeyer & Kun Zhang, 2023. "Redeeming Falsifiability?," Papers 2303.15723, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2303.15723
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.15723
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    References listed on IDEAS

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