Many inspections are manipulable
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- Yossi Feinberg & Nicolas Lambert, 2015. "Mostly calibrated," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 153-163, February.
- Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 1425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1437-1466, November.
- Dean Foster & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Calibration: Respice, Adspice, Prospice," Discussion Papers 1537, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Colin, Stewart, 2011. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2029-2041, September.
- David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2015. "On the Failures of Bonus Plans," Papers 1505.04587, arXiv.org.
- Feinberg, Yossi & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2011. "Mostly Calibrated," Research Papers 2090, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Olszewski, Wojciech, 2015. "Calibration and Expert Testing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
- Hu, Tai Wei & Shmaya, Eran, 2013. "Expressible inspections," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
- Flesch JÃ¡nos & Kuipers Jeroen & Mashiah-Yaakovi Ayala & Schoenmakers Gijs & Solan Eilon & Vrieze Koos, 2010. "Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Arieli, Itai & Levy, Yehuda John, 2015. "Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 166-185.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2010. "Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2203-2217, November.
More about this item
KeywordsForecasting; calibration; zero-sum games;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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