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A new Keynesian model with endogenous technology trend

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  • Kuehn, S.

    (Macro, International & Labour Economics)

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  • Kuehn, S., 2010. "A new Keynesian model with endogenous technology trend," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010040
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2010040
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 911-929, November.
    2. J. Flesch & J. Kuipers & G. Schoenmakers & K. Vrieze, 2010. "Subgame Perfection in Positive Recursive Games with Perfect Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(1), pages 193-207, February.
    3. Kuipers, J. & Flesch, J. & Schoenmakers, G.M. & Vrieze, K., 2008. "Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. Reinhard Selten, 1973. "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 008, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    5. ,, 2008. "Many inspections are manipulable," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
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