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Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs

  • Flesch János
  • Kuipers Jeroen
  • Mashiah-Yaakovi Ayala
  • Schoenmakers Gijs
  • Solan Eilon
  • Vrieze Koos

    (METEOR)

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    We prove that every multi-player Borel game with bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies.

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    Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 040.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010040
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    1. Nicolas, VIEILLE & Eilon, SOLAN, 2003. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," Les Cahiers de Recherche 772, HEC Paris.
    2. Shmaya, Eran, 2008. "Many inspections are manipulable," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
    3. Kuipers Jeroen & Flesch Janos & Schoenmakers Gijs & Vrieze Koos, 2008. "Pure Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Free Transition Games," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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