Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs
We prove that every multi-player Borel game with bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies.
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- Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan, 2003. "Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games," Post-Print hal-00464953, HAL.
- Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003.
"Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 911-929, November.
- Nicolas, VIEILLE & Eilon, SOLAN, 2003. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," Les Cahiers de Recherche 772, HEC Paris.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vielle, 2002. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," Discussion Papers 1355, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," Working Papers hal-00591681, HAL.
- Shmaya, Eran, 2008. "Many inspections are manipulable," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
- Kuipers Jeroen & Flesch Janos & Schoenmakers Gijs & Vrieze Koos, 2008. "Pure Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Free Transition Games," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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