IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/umamet/2008027.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Pure Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Free Transition Games

Author

Listed:
  • Kuipers Jeroen
  • Flesch Janos
  • Schoenmakers Gijs
  • Vrieze Koos

    (METEOR)

Abstract

We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each player upon termination of the game, which depends only on the player who decided to terminate. We give a combinatorial proof of the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies for the games in our class.

Suggested Citation

  • Kuipers Jeroen & Flesch Janos & Schoenmakers Gijs & Vrieze Koos, 2008. "Pure Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Free Transition Games," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008027
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/portal/files/880985/content
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 911-929, November.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Flesch, J. & Kuipers, J. & Schoenmakers, G. & Vrieze, K., 2013. "Subgame-perfection in free transition games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 201-207.
    2. Flesch János & Kuipers Jeroen & Schoenmakers Gijs & Vrieze Koos, 2008. "Subgame-Perfection in Stochastic Games with Perfect Information and Recursive Payoffs," Research Memorandum 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Flesch János & Kuipers Jeroen & Mashiah-Yaakovi Ayala & Schoenmakers Gijs & Solan Eilon & Vrieze Koos, 2010. "Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. Flesch J. & Kuipers J. & Schoenmakers G. & Vrieze K., 2011. "Subgame-Perfection in Free Transition Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    mathematical economics;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008027. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Leonne Portz). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/meteonl.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.