Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names
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- Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2006.
"The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring,"
Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1499-1544, November.
- Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 172782000000000006, www.najecon.org.
- Kandori, Michihiro, 1992.
"Social Norms and Community Enforcement,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005.
"Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 377-415, 03.
- Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June.
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2010. "Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 42-62, January.
- Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002.
"A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January.
- Jeffrey Ely, 2000. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0210, Econometric Society.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1264, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Rosenthal, R W, 1979. "Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1353-66, November.
- Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
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