Cooperation in Large Societies
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References listed on IDEAS
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 377-415, March.
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2010. "Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 42-62, January.
More about this item
KeywordsCooperation; Many Agents; Repeated Game; Unilateral Help;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-04-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-04-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-04-23 (Microeconomics)
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