The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring
"Selection in Dynamic Games" 1. Assortative Matching with costly search, presented by Alp Atakan 2. A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium with Application to Decentralized Collusion, presented by Peter Eso 3. Noisy evolution in Normal form Games, presented by Christoph Kuzmics 4. The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring presented by Johannes Horner Abstract: We study repeated games in which monitoring is imperfect and private. We prove the folk theorem for all two-player (finite) games assuming that the monitoring is almost perfect, but not necessarily almost public
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed004:475. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.