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Citations for "A Model of Expertise"

by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan

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  1. Marco Battaglini, 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1557, Econometric Society.
  2. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2000. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0341, Econometric Society.
  3. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2003. "Ordinal Cheap Talk," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2003-05, Claremont Colleges.
  4. Sinkey, Michael, 2015. "How do experts update beliefs? Lessons from a non-market environment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 55-63.
  5. Ascensión Andina Díaz, 2013. "Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk," Working Papers 2013-02, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  6. Amorós, Pablo, 2009. "Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1211-1226, May.
  7. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2014. "A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 299-316.
  8. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2003. "International agreements on product standards: an incomplete-contracting theory," Working Papers 229, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  9. Margaret Meyer & Ines Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Series Working Papers 789, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  10. Robert Bartels & Denzil Fiebig & Arthur Soest, 2006. "Consumers and experts: an econometric analysis of the demand for water heaters," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 369-391, June.
  11. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
  12. Ulrich Doraszelski, 1999. "Deliberations with Double-Sided Information," Discussion Papers 1276R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Dessein, Wouter, 2007. "Why a Group Needs a Leader: Decision-making and Debate in Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 6168, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Cheap Talk About The Detection Probability," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(01), pages 1-16.
  15. Shapiro, Jesse M., 2016. "Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 91-108.
  16. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-23, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  17. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  18. Ilan Guttman & Ohad Kadan & Eugene Kandel, 2003. "Adding the Noise: A Theory of Compensation-Driven Earnings Management," Discussion Paper Series dp355, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  19. Berthomé, Guy-El-Karim & Thomas, Alban, 2016. "A Context-based Procedure for Assessing Participatory Schemes in Environmental Planning," TSE Working Papers 16-729, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  20. Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," Microeconomics 0402013, EconWPA.
  21. Mishra,Ajit Kumar & Sarangi,Sudipta, 2015. "High-powered incentives and communication failure," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7345, The World Bank.
  22. Giacomo Ponzetto, 2008. "Asymmetric information and trade policy," Economics Working Papers 1253, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2010.
  23. Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions," Working Papers 10.01, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
  24. Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Dynamic sender-receiver games," Post-Print hal-00804028, HAL.
  25. A. Rubinstein & J. Glazer, "undated". "Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s7, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  26. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
  27. Andrew Feltenstein & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-08, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  28. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007.
  29. Andrew Austin & Nathaniel T. Wilcox, 2004. "Believing in Economic Theory: Sex, Lies, Evidence, Trust and Ideology," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp238, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  30. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.
  31. Junghun Cho, 2008. "Sequential Cheap Talk from Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp352, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  32. Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.
  33. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  34. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2012. "Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754576, HAL.
  35. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.
  36. A.K.S. Chand, 2012. "Strategic Information Transmission with Budget Constraint," Working Papers 2012_19, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  37. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 15-30.
  38. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
  39. Chan, Jimmy & Suen, Wing, 2009. "Media as watchdogs: The role of news media in electoral competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 799-814, October.
  40. Klaas J. Beniers & Otto H. Swank, 2003. "On the Composition of Committees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-006/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  41. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sorensen, 1999. "Professional Advice," Game Theory and Information 9906003, EconWPA.
  42. Calzolari, Giacomo & Immordino, Giovanni, 2005. "Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 145-172, January.
  43. Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2005. "Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  44. Semenov, Aggey & Martimort, David, 2004. "Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying," MPRA Paper 8519, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  45. Jean-Philippe Platteau & Vincent Somville & Zaki Wahhaj, 2013. "Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay," Studies in Economics 1305, School of Economics, University of Kent.
  46. Ricardo Alonso, 2009. "Strategic control and strategic communication," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58682, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  47. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2012. "Eliciting Information from a Committee," Working Papers 692, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  48. Rudiger, Jesper, 2013. "Cross-Checking the Media," MPRA Paper 51786, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  49. Niclas Berggren, 2012. "Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(3), pages 199-221, September.
  50. Aaron S. Edlin, 1997. "Is the Corner Electronics Store Violationg the Antitrust Laws? (or Why the Good Guys Aren't)," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1009, David K. Levine.
  51. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Receiver's access fee for a single sender," Working Papers IES 2014/17, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2014.
  52. Roldan, Flavia, 2009. "The organization of expertise in the presence of communication," IESE Research Papers D/835, IESE Business School.
  53. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When does coordination require centralization?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58664, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  54. Amoros, Pablo & Corchon, Luis C. & Moreno, Bernardo, 2002. "The Scholarship Assignment Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-18, January.
  55. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, EconWPA.
  56. Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "On the Role and Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  57. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Accountability and Cheap Talk," MPRA Paper 18652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  58. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2016. "Cheap talk with an informed receiver," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 61-72, April.
  59. Turkay, Evsen, 2011. "Evidence disclosure and severity of punishments," MPRA Paper 31504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  60. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers 2016-13, CRESE.
  61. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  62. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
  63. Y. Braouezec, 2010. "Committee, Expert Advice, and the Weighted Majority Algorithm: An Application to the Pricing Decision of a Monopolist," Post-Print hal-00677779, HAL.
  64. Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K. & Zhao, Jinhua, 2008. "Rational exaggeration in information aggregation games," CUDARE Working Paper Series 1067, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
  65. Asher Wolinsky, 1999. "Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts," Discussion Papers 1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  66. Alonso, Ricardo & Dessein, Wouter & Matouschek, Niko, 2006. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5802, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  67. Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, 2005. "Market Distortions when Agents are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions," NBER Working Papers 11053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  68. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro & Michael Sinkinson, 2009. "The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics," NBER Working Papers 15544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  69. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
  70. Kawamura, Kohei, 2013. "Eliciting information from a large population," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 44-54.
  71. Zara Sharif & Otto H. Swank, 2012. "Do More Powerful Interest Groups have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-134/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  72. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  73. Junichiro Ishida, 2009. "Why Hierarchy? Communication and Information Acquisition in Organizations," ISER Discussion Paper 0751, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  74. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Contracts for Experts with Opposing Interests," Discussion Papers 5, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Feb 2010.
  75. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
    • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
  76. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 419-441.
  77. Kawai, Keiichi, 2015. "Sequential cheap talks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 128-133.
  78. Gilat Levy, 2000. "Strategic consultation in the presence of career concerns," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3627, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  79. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.
  80. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics," MPRA Paper 6989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  81. Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April.
  82. Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When second opinions hurt: a model of expert advice under career concerns," MPRA Paper 27176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  83. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2013. "Dynamic Commercial Lobbying," CESifo Working Paper Series 4114, CESifo Group Munich.
  84. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
  85. Javier A. Prado Domínguez & Antonio García Lorenzo, 2010. "Competencia e incentivos a la cooperación en la interacción de grupos de interés que pretenden aumentar su influencia política directa: ¿cuál es la importancia de la presión política?," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 192(1), pages 105-125, March.
  86. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
  87. Lima, Rafael Costa & Moreira, Humberto, 2014. "Information transmission and inefficient lobbying," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 282-307.
  88. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
  89. Donner, Herman & Kopsch, Fredrik, 2016. "Housing Tenure and Informational Asymmetries," Working Paper Series 16/3, Department of Real Estate and Construction Management & Centre for Banking and Finance (cefin), Royal Institute of Technology.
  90. repec:esx:essedp:668 is not listed on IDEAS
  91. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2004. "Multidimensional Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 4393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  92. Kohei Kawamura, 2006. "Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission," Economics Series Working Papers 268, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  93. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
  94. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  95. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
  96. Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002.
  97. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.
  98. Bourjade, Sylvain & Jullien, Bruno, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," MPRA Paper 34813, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  99. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1639, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  100. Alessandro Acquisti, 2014. "Inducing Customers to Try New Goods," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(2), pages 131-146, March.
  101. Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  102. Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
  103. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  104. Battaglini, Marco & Bénabou, Roland, 2002. "Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 3611, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  105. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  106. In-Uck Park, 2000. "Cheap Talk Reputation and Coordination of Differentiated Experts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1680, Econometric Society.
  107. Maxim Ivanov, 2016. "Dynamic learning and strategic communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 627-653, August.
  108. Kawamura, Kohei, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-25, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  109. Dziuda, Wioletta, 2011. "Strategic argumentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1362-1397, July.
  110. Takashi Shimizu, 2016. "Cheap Talk with an Exit Option: A Model of Exit and Voice," Discussion Papers 1607, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
  111. Stephen Morris, 1998. "An Instrumental Theory of Political Correctness," Discussion Papers 1209, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  112. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
  113. Kohei Kawamura, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," ESE Discussion Papers 182, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  114. Viola Chen, 2008. "Essays in Applied Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002243, David K. Levine.
  115. Gordon Rausser & Leo Simon & Jinhua Zhao, 2015. "Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
  116. Frisell, Lars, 2000. "Taking Advice from Imperfectly Informed Lobbyists: When to Match Hawks with Hawks," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 355, Stockholm School of Economics.
  117. repec:dpr:wpaper:0746 is not listed on IDEAS
  118. Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information," THEMA Working Papers 2006-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  119. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2016. "Repeated Lobbying by Commercial Lobbyists and Special Interests," CESifo Working Paper Series 5809, CESifo Group Munich.
  120. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis," DFAEII Working Papers 8770, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  121. Robert Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2005. "Producing and Manipulating Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 185-199, 01.
  122. Marino, Anthony M., 2006. "Delegation versus an approval process and the demand for talent," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 487-503, May.
  123. Che, Yeon-Koo & Severinov, Sergei, 2007. "Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure," MPRA Paper 6101, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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