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Information Exposure and Corporate Citizenship

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  • Liu, Lisa Yao
  • Lu, Shirley

Abstract

We explore how information exposure, specifically information transmission within organizations, facilitates companies' roles as corporate citizens. We study whether US firms' business networks with China and Italy become their information advantage, and examine whether firms use relevant information to mitigate the negative shocks of COVID-19. We start by validating our measurement of information exposure. Next, we find that a higher number of work-from-home ("WFH") policies, as evidenced by a higher stay-at-home ratio, are implemented in areas with more information-exposure companies, even before local governments impose a lockdown. To further demonstrate corporate citizenship, we document firms' positive social impact-lower COVID-19 growth and an influence on other firms' WFH policies-and show suggestive evidence on firms' social motives.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Lisa Yao & Lu, Shirley, 2021. "Information Exposure and Corporate Citizenship," Working Papers 312, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:312
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information exposure; information transmission; business networks; COVID; corporate citizenship;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

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