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Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Myerson, Roger B.

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

Roger B. Myerson delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2007-6, Nobel Prize Committee.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_006
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    Cited by:

    1. Noriko Irie & Ryusei Iwamura & Kaho Sugiura & Naoko Kawahara, 2022. "Siting Renewable Energy Facilities Using a Matching Algorithm: A Case Study in Japan," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-15, December.
    2. Liu, Lisa Yao & Lu, Shirley, 2021. "Information Exposure and Corporate Citizenship," Working Papers 312, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    3. Alexia Gaudeul, 2009. "A (Micro) Course in Microeconomic Theory for MSc Students," Working Papers id:1986, eSocialSciences.
    4. Christian Erik Kampmann & John D. Sterman, 2014. "Do markets mitigate misperceptions of feedback?," System Dynamics Review, System Dynamics Society, vol. 30(3), pages 123-160, July.
    5. Nguyen, Phong Thanh & Nguyen, Linh Thi My, 2022. "Understanding platform market value through decentralization governance — An integrative model from signaling and mechanism design theory," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    6. Jerg Gutmann & Viola Lucas, 2018. "Private-Sector Corruption: Measurement and Cultural Origins," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 138(2), pages 747-770, July.
    7. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    8. COITA Ioana–Florina, 2019. "An Innovative Perspective On Financial Decision-Making," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(2), pages 109-118, December.
    9. Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2017. "Capitalism and Socialism: Review of Kornai’s Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 11866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Randal K. Quarles, 2019. "Friedrich Hayek and the Price System : a speech at \"The Road to Serfdom at 75: The Future of Classical Liberalism and the Free Market\" Ninth Annual Conference of the William F. Buckley, Jr," Speech 1100, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. J. Patrick Gunning, 2010. "Incentive Divergence and the Global Financial Crisis," Chapters, in: Steven Kates (ed.), Macroeconomic Theory and its Failings, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Iván Major, 2019. "Two-Sided Information Asymmetry in the Healthcare Industry," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(2), pages 177-193, May.
    13. Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2008. "A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0819, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    14. Calvin Blackwell, 2011. "Using a Simple Contest to Illustrate Mechanism Design," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(4), pages 375-387, October.
    15. Dirk Simons & Michael Ebert, 2008. "Interne Nutzung des Goodwill-Accounting als Informationsinstrument bei angestrebten Unternehmensübernahmen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 60(59), pages 43-68, January.
    16. Gary A. Dymski, 2011. "Limits of Policy Intervention in a World of Neoliberal Mechanism Designs: Paradoxes of the Global Crisis," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(3), pages 285-308, September.
    17. Yenming J Chen & Henry Tsai & Yi-Fen Liu, 2018. "Supply chain finance risk management," Tourism Economics, , vol. 24(5), pages 593-614, August.
    18. Hans Pitlik & Björn Frank & Mathias Firchow, 2010. "The demand for transparency: An empirical note," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 177-195, June.
    19. Major, Iván, 2014. "Ha elfogy a bizalom... Kialakítható-e optimális mechanizmus kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információ esetén? [When confidence evaporates&. Does optimal mechanism design exist under doubly asymmetric info," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 148-165.
    20. William Keech & Michael Munger, 2015. "The anatomy of government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 1-42, July.
    21. Kim, Jin Yeub, 2017. "Interim third-party selection in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 645-665.
    22. Moret, Fabio & Pinson, Pierre & Papakonstantinou, Athanasios, 2020. "Heterogeneous risk preferences in community-based electricity markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(1), pages 36-48.
    23. Major, Iván, 2013. "When trust fades...: Can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?," 24th European Regional ITS Conference, Florence 2013 88522, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    24. Van Basshuysen, Philippe, 2021. "Rationality in games and institutions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112463, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism Design;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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