Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory
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- Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2007-6, Nobel Prize Committee.
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- Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2017. "Capitalism and Socialism: Review of Kornai's Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 11866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hans Pitlik & Björn Frank & Mathias Firchow, 2010. "The demand for transparency: An empirical note," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 177-195, June.
- Major, Iván, 2014.
"Ha elfogy a bizalom... Kialakítható-e optimális mechanizmus kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információ esetén?
[When confidence evaporates&. Does optimal mechanism design exist under doubly asymmetric info," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 148-165.
- Alexia Gaudeul, 2009.
"A (Micro) Course in Microeconomic Theory for MSc Students,"
- Gaudeul, Alexia, 2009. "A (micro) course in microeconomic theory for MSc students," MPRA Paper 15388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Christian Erik Kampmann & John D. Sterman, 2014. "Do markets mitigate misperceptions of feedback?," System Dynamics Review, System Dynamics Society, vol. 30(3), pages 123-160, July.
- J. Patrick Gunning, 2010. "Incentive Divergence and the Global Financial Crisis," Chapters,in: Macroeconomic Theory and its Failings, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2008. "A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0819, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- William Keech & Michael Munger, 2015. "The anatomy of government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 1-42, July.
- Kim, Jin Yeub, 2017. "Interim third-party selection in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 645-665.
- Gary A. Dymski, 2011. "Limits of Policy Intervention in a World of Neoliberal Mechanism Designs: Paradoxes of the Global Crisis," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(3), pages 285-308, September.
- Major, Iván, 2013. "When trust fades...: Can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?," 24th European Regional ITS Conference, Florence 2013 88522, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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